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1. Introduction 
After the deep recession of 1999 and the financial crisis of 1998–99, the Colombian economy 
experienced a protracted period of low growth and declining inflation (2000–03). The effect of 
the crisis on the balance sheet positions of households and firms hindered the expansion of 
consumption and investment expenditure. Also, external shocks, like the growth slowdown of 
Colombia’s main trading partners between 2001 and 2002, or the large increases of 
sovereign risk premia in 2002, had an impact on aggregate demand and on the costs of 
imported inputs and capital goods. The economy generally worked below capacity 
throughout this period and, with the exception of a brief span between 2002 and 2003, 
inflation continued to decrease. Accordingly, monetary policy was relatively loose at the time, 
with real short-term interest rates well below their historical average. Only in the first half of 
2003 were policy rates adjusted upwards to offset the pass-through effects of the great 
depreciation of the currency that occurred in the second semester of 2002, after the jump in 
sovereign risk premia.  
Since 2004 domestic and external conditions has favored a recovery of growth and induced 
an appreciation of the currency. Risk premia declined rapidly, growth rates of the main 
trading partners accelerated, terms of trade rose with the increases in world commodity 
prices, and improved internal security bolstered consumer and investor confidence, leading 
to large FDI inflows and high rates of growth in consumption and investment. Monetary policy 
then had a “honeymoon” period, in which growth rose while inflation fell due to the 
appreciation of the currency and the existing unused capacity. In fact, policy interest rates 
were reduced throughout 2004 and 2005.  
In 2006 the central bank faced its first real challenge in years, when a number of variables 
signaled a possible overheating of the economy, and yet inflation kept falling. The quick pace 
of fixed investment and the perceived increases in productivity raised the possibility that the 
enhanced production capacity contained the inflationary effects of the rapidly expanding 
aggregate demand. Nevertheless, the central bank tightened policy. Time has shown that 
this move was opportune and adequate.  
More recently, the large and persistent increases in the prices of food and energy have 
posed another challenge for the central bank. In an economy where inflation has not 
converged with its long-run target and the credibility of monetary policy is far from perfect, 
the size and length of these “supply shocks” were a serious concern. Not only did they have 
various effects on disposable income (Colombia exports and imports many of these 
commodities), but they were also transmitted to core inflation through indexation and 
expectations channels. Hence, the monetary authorities found themselves in a difficult 
situation in 2008. On the one hand, growth was abruptly slowing down because of the effects 
of previous monetary policy and the impact of supply shocks on costs, income and output. 
On the other hand, the shocks increased inflation and caused large deviations from the 
central bank’s target in 2007 and 2008, threatening to spread to other prices and wages. In 
this context, policy rates were increased in July 2008. 130  BIS Papers No 49
 
 
This paper describes these challenges and explains the reaction of the central bank. In the 
case of the 2006 episode, emphasis is placed on the information provided by productivity 
and unit labor costs statistics in detecting inflationary pressures. It is apparent that the 
cyclical components embedded in these series limit their usefulness and, in the absence of 
models that allow us to understand their behavior, they must be examined within a wider 
array of macroeconomic and financial variables.  
For the 2007–08 episode, the discussion focuses on the role of core inflation measures, 
some of which are evaluated according to the standard criteria. No particular measure seems 
to be clearly superior to the others, a result similar to that found by Rich and Steindel (2007), 
who explain this as a reflection of the varying nature of the transitory shocks hitting inflation. 
Consequently, we argue that the monitoring of core inflation measures must be 
complemented with an assessment of the nature of the inflation shocks and an analysis of 
the transmission of the transitory shocks to macroeconomic inflation. We explore this 
transmission in the final part of the paper by examining the determination of inflation 
expectations, the effects of transitory inflation shocks on inflation expectations and the 
impact of shocks to subsets of the consumer price index (CPI) basket on other subsets and 
the overall CPI.  
2.  2006: detecting an overheating economy 
The improved external and domestic conditions after 2004 produced an appreciation of the 
currency and an acceleration of aggregate expenditure and output (Table 1 and Graphs 1 
and 2). Inflation fell almost continually from the beginning of 2003 to mid-2006, along the 
targets established by the central bank (Graph 3). For most of this period, monetary 
authorities were confident in the expected future decline of inflation, given the appreciation 
and the large, negative output gap inherited from the recession and the financial crisis of 
1998–99 (Graph 4). This gap was believed to close slowly thanks to the rapid growth of 
investment and the expansion of total factor productivity (TFP). The fixed investment ratio 
rose from 11.7% of GDP in December 1999 to 24.7% in June 2008 (Graph 5), producing 
acceleration in the growth rate of the stock of capital (Graph 6). Similarly, TFP annual growth 
rates, as approximated by the Solow residual, rose from around 0% in 2000–03 to about 2% 
from 2004 (Graph 7).
1 
Policy interest rates were reduced accordingly, from 7.5% in the beginning of 2004 to 6% in 
the fourth quarter of 2005. Real ex-post interest rates remained stable because of the fall in 
inflation (Graph 8). However, by the second quarter of 2006, the cumulative differences 
between domestic demand and output growth raised the question of whether the excess 
capacity in the economy was being exhausted. Some skeptics pointed to the fact that 
inflation was still falling (CPI annual inflation reached a historical minimum of 4% in June 
2006 – Graph 3). In addition, investment growth was strong (Table 1) and both total 
                                                  
1   Calculation of the Solow residual series controlled for delays in installation and the degree of utilization of the 
capital stock, as well as for variations in the global participation rates and the rate of unemployment of the 
labor input:  




a), where  
L = Working age population x global participation rate x (1 – unemployment rate), and 
K
e = Lagged capital stock (one-year) x capacity utilization index. 
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productivity and labor productivity kept increasing for the economy as a whole (Graph 9).
2 
Filtered total factor productivity indicators were edging up, suggesting a change in trend TFP 
growth, while there were no large deviations of estimated TFP from this trend (Graph 10).
3 
Labor productivity indicators in manufacturing industry, the sector with the most complete 
information, also showed continuous improvement (Graphs 11 and 12). Both output per 
worker and output per hour kept increasing at a pace similar to the one observed in previous 
years. There was no evidence of large excesses when comparing the productivity series with 
their filtered counterparts, while the latter suggested an increase in trend growth. A similar 
picture emerged from the unit labor cost (ULC) indicators for the manufacturing and retail 
industries (Graphs 13 and 14). Thus, there were no indications of inflationary pressures 
stemming from rising marginal costs that could push up prices.  
This was, however, a misleading conclusion. Other indicators, such as capacity utilization 
indices derived from surveys, showed a rapidly decreasing slack in the economy, even as 
investment and productivity kept growing (Graph 15). Consumer confidence indicators, which 
had shown a close relationship with consumption growth, pointed to a strong performance in 
the immediate future (Graph 16). Credit growth was recovering fast, after years of stagnation 
following the financial crisis (Graph 17), especially in the segments of consumer and 
commercial loans. 
Based on this and other evidence, the central bank decided to start a tightening cycle in April 
2006, despite the fact that headline CPI inflation and the core measures in use were still 
declining. Time showed that this was a wise decision. Soon after, core inflation measures 
started to rise, while the financial intermediaries produced a great shock to the credit supply, 
as they shifted their asset portfolio away from public bonds and into loans to the private 
sector. The average of the five core inflation measures monitored in the central bank went 
from 3.5% (year on year) in April 2006 to 4.8% in April 2007. Real growth of bank loans went 
from 10% in December 2005 to 27% in December 2006. Aggregate expenditure growth 
accelerated, as reflected by the widening of the current account deficit of the balance of 
payments, from 1.8% of GDP in the second half of 2006 to 3.6% of GDP in the first semester 
of 2007.  
Graphs 10 through 14 show that in the second half of 2006 and in 2007 there were 
significant deviations of productivity and ULC indicators from trend, confirming the excesses 
illustrated with other variables. Thus, not all the increase in observed productivity was finally 
attributable to trend TFP growth or to sustainable capital accumulation. Based on these 
indicators alone, policymakers were not able to distinguish short-term “demand” pressures 
from long-term “supply” movements. There may be several explanations for this, most 
notably the effects of labor hoarding. In any case, one lesson derived from this episode was 
that, in the absence of models that help us understand the dynamics of measured 
productivity, the information provided by these indicators must be examined within a wider 
array of macroeconomic and financial variables. 
                                                  
2   Both TFP and labor productivity measures are adjusted by variations in participation rates, unemployment 
rates and capacity utilization (see footnote 1).  
3   The calculation of TFP controlled for variations in participation and unemployment rates, as well as for the 
degree capacity utilization of the capital stock (see footnote 1). 132  BIS Papers No 49
 
 
3. 2007–08:  dealing  with supply shocks 
In 2007 and 2008 the Colombian economy was hit by several shocks that produced large 
increases in food and regulated prices.
4 These shocks differed in their persistence and 
origin, but occurred at a time when aggregate demand pressures were still present. Hence, 
they complicated monetary policy by blurring the assessment of long-term inflationary 
pressures. What part of the observed rise in inflation was due to transitory price level 
shocks? How persistent were some of these supply shocks? To what extent were inflation 
expectations and core inflation affected by the shocks? These were some of the questions 
that have bewildered policymakers throughout the past two years. 
To further complicate the matter, both relative regulated and food prices have exhibited an 
increasing trend over the last decade (Graph 18), partly due, in the case of regulated prices, 
to the gradual elimination of subsidies (fuel and public utilities). The existence of such a trend 
made it difficult to isolate the size and the effect of the shocks. For example, CPI ex food and 
regulated prices is sometimes used as a measure of core inflation. While this is a useful 
concept for analyzing the transmission mechanisms of monetary policy,
5 it significantly 
underestimates CPI inflation over a long period of time. 
Supply shocks during 2007–08 came from three sources. One was related to climate events 
(a drought in 2007 due to the El Niño phenomenon, and subsequent periods of excessive 
rainfall), which have affected prices of unprocessed food. A second source was the rise in 
world commodity prices, which has had direct and indirect effects on the CPI. Among the 
direct effects are the increases in the prices of fuel, transportation, energy and foodstuffs 
related to bio-fuel production (cereals, sugar, etc). Indirect effects have been reflected in fast 
growing costs of production, as raw materials became more expensive. Finally, a third 
source of shocks was connected to the second one and had to do with the rapidly expanding 
demand for Colombian exports to Venezuela (an oil exporter and Colombia’s second main 
trading partner), which put strong pressure on the prices of some food items, such as meat in 
2007. 
Table 2 shows the behavior of the prices most affected by the aforementioned shocks. 
Unprocessed food price inflation moved up and down with the climate events, while meat 
prices increased above CPI inflation throughout 2007, reflecting the one-time effect of the 
rising demand from Venezuela. On the other hand, the relative prices of energy and the food 
items related to energy production exhibited a more sustained trend, following world prices. 
However, the pass-through of international food prices to domestic food prices was mitigated 
in 2007 thanks to the appreciation of the peso, as Gómez has shown (2008). Raw materials 
cost pressures were significant in 2008 despite the appreciation of the currency, as indicated 
by producer price index (PPI) inflation (Graph 19).  
During 2007 these shocks reinforced the rationale for tightening monetary policy, since 
demand pressures were being complicated by relative price movements that could spread to 
inflation expectations and other prices and wages. In 2008, however, signs of an economic 
slowdown were clear. In fact, the deceleration was faster than expected due to the impact of 
the shocks on the costs of production and real disposable income, among other things 
(Graphs 19 and 20).  
                                                  
4   Food accounts for 29.1% of the 1999 CPI basket and includes unprocessed foodstuff (potatoes, vegetables 
and fruits), processed food and food away from home. Regulated prices represent 9.04% of the 1999 CPI 
basket, and include electricity, natural gas, water, sewage and garbage collection, urban public transportation, 
inter-municipal public transportation, and fuel (gasoline and diesel). 
5   In fact, the core macroeconomic forecast/simulation model used in the central bank breaks down CPI into four 
components: food prices, regulated prices, tradable goods and services ex food and regulated prices, and 
non-tradable goods and services ex food and regulated prices. BIS Papers No 49  133
 
 
Nonetheless, the monetary authorities were reluctant to start loosening policy. The 
uncertainty about the persistence and effects of the shocks, as well as the augmented 
likelihood of missing the inflation target for a second, consecutive year, troubled 
policymakers. At the same time, the uncertainty about the unfolding of the international 
financial crisis clouded the forecast of demand inflationary pressures. It was not clear 
whether the pace of the economic slowdown was compatible with the resumption of the 
disinflation process in the context of an economy hit by supply shocks. The presence of a still 
positive “output gap” and the size of the shocks themselves tilted the balance toward the 
inflation risk. Consequently, policy rates were increased by 25 bps in July.  
Not surprisingly, part of the policy discussions during this period focused on the nature and 
persistence of the shocks, and on the adequate measure of macroeconomic inflation. The 
five core inflation indicators regularly followed at the central bank sent different messages 
regarding macroeconomic inflationary pressures (Graph 21). In general, the measures that 
exclude food and energy prices, or food and regulated prices, showed stable core inflation, 
within the central bank’s range target. Other indicators with different exclusion criteria
6 
captured the increasing trend of headline CPI inflation to different degrees. Thus, there was 
no clear signal from these measures and the question on which ones were the most reliable 
arose naturally. 
3.1  An evaluation of core inflation measures 
To answer this question, the five core inflation indicators monitored at the central bank are 
evaluated along with other commonly used core inflation measures, according to the 
standard criteria:
7 (i) bias with respect to CPI inflation over a long period; (ii) volatility with 
respect a long-run trend; (iii) ability to forecast future inflation; (iv) ability to track the long-run 
component of CPI inflation; (v) relationship with macroeconomic determinants of inflation 
(output gap); and (vi) ease of interpretation/communication and absence of frequent 
revisions. An ideal core inflation indicator is unbiased, has low volatility, is useful to forecast 
inflation, tracks closely the long-run component of CPI inflation, displays a close relationship 
with the macroeconomic determinants of inflation, is easy to follow by the public, and is 
subject to few revisions. The technical details of the criteria used in the evaluation are 
explained in the Appendix. 
The sample is made up by monthly observations of 12-month core inflation indicators 
between December 1999 and November 2008. This period corresponds to a “low inflation 
regime” (Betancourt et al, (2009)) and is characterized by a homogeneous CPI series 
(December 1998 = 100). The evaluation is conducted for 12-month core inflation because 
this is the measure most generally followed and understood in Colombia, and because it 
partially corrects the seasonality present in the CPI measure. The indicators considered are 
the following: 
  Inflation excluding food (X-food) 
  Inflation excluding food and regulated prices (X-food-reg) 
  Inflation excluding unprocessed food, fuel and public utilities (X-“noise”) 
  Inflation excluding food (ex beverages), energy, gas and fuel (X-food-ener) 
                                                  
6    CPI excluding food, CPI excluding unprocessed food (ex beverages), fuel and public utilities, and CPI 
excluding the most volatile items (1990–99) accounting for 20% of the basket. 
7  See for example Rich and Steindel (2007) and Cecchetti (2007).  134  BIS Papers No 49
 
 
  Inflation trimming the most volatile items (1990–99) accounting for 20% of the CPI 
basket (TMV20-9099)  
  Inflation trimming the most volatile items (1999–2008) accounting for 5% and 20% of 
the CPI basket, respectively (TMV5-9908 and TMV20-9908). 
  Inflation trimming the most volatile items (1999–2008), where the trimmed 
percentage of the basket (2.68%) was chosen to track as closely as possible the 
long-run component of headline CPI inflation
8 (TMVop).  
  The median and 5%, 10% and 20% symmetric trimmed CPI inflation means. 
The main results of the evaluation may be summarized as follows: 
i.  Bias: Table 3 shows that only the TMV indicators yield unbiased gauges of inflation. 
The measures that exclude food or regulated prices are generally biased 
downwards, a result related to the upward trend of the relative prices of these items 
in the sample (Graph 18).  
ii.  Volatility: Table 4 shows that, in general, core inflation indicators are smoother than 
headline CPI, with the notable exception of the median and the trimmed means.  
iii.  Ability to forecast future headline inflation: From Table 7 it is apparent that the 
core measures that exclude food and some or all regulated prices help forecast 
future headline inflation (in-sample) better than other core inflation gauges at 
horizons greater than three months. Trimmed means and TMV indicators do badly in 
this regard. Out of sample RMSEs suggest a similar pattern, although TMV 
measures are now included among the indicators that better help forecast future 
inflation at different horizons (Table 8). 
iv.  Ability to track the long-run component of inflation: By construction, TMVop 
tracks long-run inflation best (Table 5). Other TMV measures also follow long-run 
inflation reasonably well, although no RMSE is significantly equal to or lower than 
that of TMVop according to the Diebold-Mariano test (Table 5). Measures that 
exclude food and some or all regulated prices fare poorly in this context, a result that 
is related to the bias they present.
9 On the other hand, Graph 22 and Table 6 
indicate that deviations of inflation without food from the inflation target closely track 
a diffusion index of inflationary pressures.
10 The corresponding RMSE is 
significantly lower than that of other core inflation measures, as shown by the 
Diebold-Mariano test. 
v.  Relationship with macroeconomic determinants of inflation: Based on 
estimated open economy Phillips Curves,
11 it follows that the industrial production 
output gap Granger-causes the core inflation measures that exclude food and some 
or all regulated prices (Table 9). There is evidence of weaker causality regarding 
TMV indicators and the 5% trimmed mean. In most cases, the in-sample fit of the 
Phillips Curves (the adjusted R
2) was high (Table 10), but the best out-of-sample fit 
                                                  
8  The long-run component of CPI headline inflation was computed by means of a Kalman filter (see the 
Appendix, section A.4) 
9  If the bias were constant, these core inflation indicators could still capture turning points of “macroeconomic” 
inflation. However, this does not seem to be the case for the last part of the sample (Graph 21).  
10  The “diffusion index” captures the percentage of the CPI basket whose price changes are above the inflation 
target. The higher the value of the diffusion index, the more widespread inflationary pressures are. In this 
sense, the deviation of a good core inflation indicator from the target should closely correlate with the diffusion 
index. 
11   See the Appendix, section A.5. BIS Papers No 49  135
 
 
was obtained for the models of inflation that exclude food and all regulated prices 
(Table 11). Other measures of core inflation that present good out-of-sample fit are 
those that exclude food and some regulated prices, as well as some of the TMV 
indicators. 
In sum, there is no single core inflation indicator that clearly satisfies all the criteria for a good 
measure of core inflation. TMV indicators are unbiased and smooth, and track long-term 
headline inflation reasonably well. However, they are beaten by other measures at 
forecasting future headline inflation, and their relationship with macroeconomic determinants 
of inflation is weaker. Inflation excluding food and all or some regulated prices are smooth, 
help predict future inflation and show a stronger relationship with the output gap. 
Nonetheless, they are biased over the nine-year period considered and, for the same reason, 
fail to track the estimated long-term component of inflation, although deviations of inflation 
without food from the inflation targets closely followed a diffusion index of inflationary 
pressures.  
The median and the trimmed means seem to be the poorest measures. They are biased, no 
less volatile than headline inflation, and do not excel in tracking long-run inflation, forecasting 
headline inflation, or in terms of their relationship with macro determinants. Further, they are 
more difficult to calculate and interpret, since the components that are excluded from the 
basket change frequently.  
The result that no particular measure appears to be clearly superior to the others is similar to 
that found by Rich and Steindel (2007), who explain this as a reflection of the varying nature 
of the transitory shocks hitting inflation. This implies that the assessment of inflationary 
pressures should not rely only on one or few core inflation indicators, since some signals 
could be picked by some measures and not by others. More importantly, it means that the 
analysis of core inflation measures must be complemented with a careful examination of the 
persistence of the shocks and a close monitoring of their impact on inflation expectations.  
For example, in Colombia conventional core inflation measures have risen moderately in the 
past two years, relative to other Latin American countries (BBVA (2008)) and, in the extreme 
case, inflation excluding food and all regulated prices has remained stable throughout the 
period. In a sense, this is reassuring because it provides evidence of a low pass-through of 
the shocks to core prices. However, it does not guarantee that macroeconomic inflation could 
not rise in the face of persistent increases in world commodity prices, given the lag with 
which they are transmitted domestically, their impact on inflation expectations and the 
existence of indexation mechanisms and practices. In fact, it is indicative that even as the 
output gap came down, non-tradable core inflation remained virtually constant in 2008 
(Table 2). 
3.2  The transmission of inflation shocks to core inflation and inflation 
expectations  
As an initial exploration of the interaction between movements of the different components of 
the CPI, a simple VAR for monthly price changes was estimated. The objective was to see 
how shocks originating in different CPI components are dynamically transmitted to inflation, 
and what the links are between the different components. The items of the CPI were grouped 
into four categories, following the classification traditionally used for the analysis of inflation 
at the central bank: food (processed and unprocessed), goods and services with regulated 
prices, tradable goods, and non-tradable goods and services. These four components 
account for 29%, 9%, 25% and 37% of the CPI basket, respectively. The VAR included the 136  BIS Papers No 49
 
 
monthly changes of the prices of those groups plus the change in total CPI, and was 
estimated for the period January 1999—November 2008.
12  
An inspection of the impulse-response functions derived from this model (Graph 23) reveals 
the following facts: 
  Food and regulated price inflation shocks are the most volatile among the 
components examined.  
  Shocks to the headline CPI monthly inflation show some persistence (two to three 
months), which means added persistence to annual inflation. The shocks to tradable 
prices have the highest persistence (eight months), and those to food prices also 
exhibit some persistence (two months).  
  A shock to headline CPI inflation has significant, positive effects on the inflation of its 
components. We could interpret them as responses to an innovation in 
macroeconomic inflation. The effect (on impact) on food prices doubles the size of 
the shock itself; conversely, the responses of tradable and non-tradable prices are 
about half the size of the shock, while the effect on regulated prices is of a similar 
magnitude. The responses of tradable and regulated price inflation are the most 
persistent. These results suggest different degrees of nominal rigidities or 
indexation.  
  The shocks to the sub-baskets of the CPI have significant, positive effects on 
headline monthly inflation on impact. The responses of CPI inflation to shocks to 
tradable and food price inflation tend to persist (up to four months). The magnitude 
of the response to a tradable price inflation shock (on impact) doubles the effect 
accounted for the size of the shock and their share of the CPI basket. The response 
to a shock to regulated price inflation also seems higher than the effect expected 
only on the basis of their share of the CPI basket. 
  Non-tradable price inflation does not display significant responses to shocks to 
tradable and food price inflation. There seems to be a significant, lagged, positive 
response to a regulated price inflation shock. 
  Tradable price inflation does not respond to a non-tradable price inflation shock. In 
contrast, it reacts positively in the face of food and regulated price inflation shocks, a 
result that may reflect the existence of a common source of the shocks (eg the 
exchange rate). 
  Food price inflation does not respond to non-tradable or regulated price inflation 
shocks. It responds positively to a tradable price inflation shock, again a result that 
may reflect the existence of a common source of the shocks (eg the exchange rate). 
  Regulated price inflation does not respond to a food price inflation shock. However, 
it reacts positively to a tradable price inflation shock and, with a lag, to a non-
tradable price inflation shock. 
In sum, consumer price inflation in Colombia exhibits some persistence, mostly related to the 
persistence of tradable and food price inflation shocks, and to the lasting responses of 
tradable and regulated price inflation to overall inflation shocks. Tradable and regulated price 
inflation shocks seem to have a relatively large impact on headline inflation. Non-tradable 
and tradable prices appear to be the most rigid, while food prices react strongly to overall 
                                                  
12   A VAR(1) was estimated. The order of the VAR was chosen according to the analysis of different information 
criteria (SIC, HQ, AIC, FPE). To account for seasonality, centered dummy variables were included. A similar 
model has been proposed by Maureira and Leyva (2008).  BIS Papers No 49  137
 
 
inflation innovations. The transmission of shocks between the CPI components considered is 
rather weak, and the impacts found possibly reflect the effect of a common shock. These 
results suggest some diffusion of relative price or supply shocks to core inflation, but do not 
indicate the existence of unanchored inflation or of a fast transmission of the shocks.  
There may be several explanations for these features. We will focus on indexation and the 
impact of the inflation shocks on inflation expectations. Indexation is a relevant factor in the 
transmission of supply shocks to core inflation in Colombia. First, a ruling of the 
Constitutional Court suggested that the purchasing power of the minimum wage should be 
sustained,
13 which means that in practice its annual adjustment is unlikely to be lower than 
CPI inflation in the previous year. This is important, since the minimum wage in Colombia is 
relatively high and about a third of the workers in the formal sector earned it in 2006 (Arango 
and Posada (2007)). Furthermore, it is commonly believed that the minimum wage 
adjustment influences the increase in wages close the minimum. If this is true, the relevance 
of the minimum wage is much higher, given that 73% of the formal sector workers received 
less than two minimum wages in 2006 (Arango and Posada (2007)).
14 Moreover, the fact that 
indexed contracts last for a year implies that a transitory shock may have large effects on 
labor costs, and that the reversion of the shock is not easily transmitted to prices. Thus, a 
significant channel of transmission of supply shocks to core inflation may be working through 
the labor cost component of several sectors in the economy.
15  
A second source of indexation in Colombia comes from regulated prices. In particular, the 
rates of electricity, gas and water/sewage are linked to past CPI or PPI. In the case of 
electricity and gas, the adjustments are monthly, while the changes in water/sewage prices 
are irregular (López, (2008)). Other regulated prices (fuel and transportation) are not 
automatically linked to past inflation, but are set by the regulators according to the evolution 
of costs.
16 Interestingly, López (2008) found that regulated price inflation is less persistent 
than overall inflation, and specifically, less persistent than services price inflation, a result 
that draws attention back to wage indexation. In addition to wage and regulated price 
indexation, there are other informal indexation practices that may help explain why inflation 
persistence remains high in Colombia, despite a reduction after the fall of inflation and the 
adoption of an inflation targeting regime (Vargas, 2007).  
In addition to indexation, the credibility of monetary policy may determine the extent to which 
supply shocks are transmitted to core inflation. González and Hamann (2006) argue that the 
high degree of persistence of inflation in Colombia has to do with imperfect credibility. The 
latter in turn is associated with the fact that the long-run inflation target has not been 
reached, which implies a slow process of learning about the “permanent” component of the 
inflation target. Indeed, the evidence presented in Gómez and Hamann (2006) favors this 
explanation over a simple ad hoc indexation hypothesis. Thus, an examination of the 
determinants of inflation expectations is warranted. 
                                                  
13   Corte Constitucional del Colombia, Sentencia (ruling) C-815/99. 
14   Nevertheless, Arango and Posada (2006) found that there is no long-run (co-integration) relationship between 
the real minimum wage and a real private sector wage obtained from household surveys. According to these 
authors, the correlation coefficient between changes of the real minimum wage and the real private sector 
wage was just 0.252 between 1984 and 2005. On the other hand, negotiations between trade unions and 
firms that result in labor contracts with wage increases for more than one year usually index the second or 
third year increases to observed CPI inflation. However, the fraction of the labor force covered by such 
contracts is very low. 
15  The minimum wage is also used to index fines and some pensions. 
16   In the case of fuel, the determination of the producer and consumer prices is rather complex, since it involves 
taxes and subsidies at different government levels (Rincón (2008)). 138  BIS Papers No 49
 
 
In Colombia the central bank conducts two surveys of inflation expectations: a monthly 
survey (since 2003) directed mostly to financial and banking sector analysts, and a quarterly 
survey (since 2000) with a broader coverage (businessmen, unions and academia among 
others). Furthermore, break-even inflation expectations implicit in the public debt market 
have been constructed since 2003. Monthly survey and break-even annual inflation 
expectations seem to be unbiased (with respect to future inflation) for the period without the 
large relative price shocks (2001–06, Table 12). In contrast, quarterly survey annual inflation 
expectations tend to exceed future inflation for the same time-span (Table 12). As expected, 
there are great forecast errors in the years of the relative price shocks (2007–08, Table 12). 
All inflation expectations indicators were as volatile as headline inflation throughout the 
2000–08 sample, a feature that may be interpreted as evidence of imperfect credibility of 
monetary policy (imperfect anchoring of inflation expectations) during this period (Table 13).  
However, Graph 24 shows that annual/annualized inflation expectations have not increased 
as much as inflation after the recent supply shocks. In the case of one-year-ahead 12-month 
inflation expectations, this means that the shocks were perceived as transitory (though 
persistent) events and that the credibility of monetary policy (the inflation target) may be 
playing a role. However, the fact that the five- and 10-year break-even inflation expectations 
rose by almost 200 bps imply that longer-term inflation expectations are far from being 
anchored.
17 Below, two questions regarding the determination of inflation expectations are 
given a preliminary answer: (i) how are inflation expectations formed? And, in particular, what 
is the role of past inflation and the inflation targets? (ii) how do inflation expectations respond 
to supply shocks? 
i.  The formation of inflation expectations: In order to explore what the impact of 
inflation and the inflation target on inflation expectations is, two reduced form 
equations for the inflation expectations were estimated. The models were fitted to 
the data coming from the monthly and quarterly surveys described earlier.
18 
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3 , 1     represent one lag autoregressive term,  1  t
m  and  t
q   represent the 
relevant inflation rate observed when the respective survey is collected and  12  t
m   
and  4  t
q   represent the inflation target set by the central bank. The superscripts m 
and q indicate the monthly and quarterly frequency of the data. The following are the 
results of the estimation.
19 
                                                  
17   This conclusion must be qualified though, since the inflation risk premia may be experiencing large 
movements. 
18  The timing of the monthly survey is as follows: At time t, when respondents report their 12-month inflation 




12 ,   ), they have not observed current annual inflation ( t
m  ), but they had observed 
inflation in t–1 ( 1  t
m  ). That is why current inflation is excluded from the regression and the one period 
lagged inflation is the “relevant” variable to analyze the impact of past inflation on expectations. In the case of 
the quarterly survey, the respondent observes annual inflation of quarter t  before he/she projects annual 
inflation one year (four quarters, t+4 periods) ahead. That is why annual inflation in t is the “relevant” measure 
to capture the effect of past inflation on expectations.  
19  For both estimated equations, residuals have a normal distribution and do not display serial correlation.  BIS Papers No 49  139
 
 
Equation  Results (p-values in parentheses) 
Estimated equation for monthly 
data  
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It is clear that inflation expectations have some persistence: in both equations the 
autoregressive term is greater than 0.3 and is statistically significant. Past inflation is 
also a significant determinant and has a greater impact on the quarterly survey 
expectations than on the monthly survey data. Conversely, the inflation target has a 
greater impact on the monthly survey expectations than on quarterly data. This 
suggests that the inflation target is more relevant for the analysts from the financial 
sector (who follow closely monetary policy) than for the public at large. Anyway, in 
both cases the inflation target set by the central bank has a significant effect on 
inflation expectations.  
Henao (2008) used data from the central bank’s quarterly survey to assess the 
reaction of the deviations of expected inflation from target to deviations of observed 
inflation from target. Interestingly, she examined inflation expectations by sector 
(transportation and communication, academics and consultants, labor unions, 
financial intermediaries, mining and industry, and big retail chains) to check for 
differences in the behavior of expectations of different agents. More precisely, 
ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of the following equation were obtained: 
    t
T









t)j and (t – 
T
t) represent, respectively, the deviations of inflation 
expectations from target for sector j and the deviation of observed inflation from 
target. Only the transportation and communication and labor union sectors exhibited 
a significant, positive response of inflation expectations to deviations of inflation 
expectation from target. For the other sectors, inflation expectations seemed to be 
“anchored”.  
On the other hand, Henao (2008) constructed an index of the credibility of the 
inflation target
20 and found that the behavior of this index depends on whether the 
inflation target of the previous year was met. She also found that the distribution of 
the inflation expectations at the beginning of a year is conditioned by the fulfillment 
of the previous year target: it is centered and concentrated around the current target 
when the previous year target was met, while it is more disperse and centered 
above the target when the previous year target was missed. These pieces of 
evidence indicate the presence of an adaptive component in the formation of 
inflation expectations. 
Finally, González et al (2009) propose an exercise that follows the spirit of a growing 
number of studies that incorporate learning mechanisms (Evans and Honkapohja 
(2002) and Woodford (2003)). Using recursive least squares, they estimate a 
learning model of survey inflation expectations of the following form:  
 
 
                                                  
20  The credibility index is defined as the percentage of respondents whose inflation expectations at the beginning 
of one year were inside the range target set for the end of that year. 
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where  h t Expect ,  represents the inflation expectations at time t for horizon h,  1  t Infla  
represents the corresponding lagged inflation rate   h Expec Infla h t t , 1 1      
corresponds to a forecasting error that reflects the learning process and  1  t Shock  
represents unexpected monetary policy shocks.
21 They found that the largest 
parameter estimate was  t  , which happened to be relatively constant and close to 
1, reflecting the important impact that observed inflation has on expectations. The 
learning parameter, t  , and the parameter that reflects the unanticipated policy 
shock,  t  , were relatively small, suggesting a slow learning rate. 
Based on the previous evidence, it is clear that survey inflation expectations are 
strongly affected by past inflation, so that persistent “supply” or “demand” shocks 
may have long-lasting effects on core inflation, if price/wage formation is influenced 
by these expectations. However, there is also evidence of an impact of the inflation 
targets on survey inflation expectations and of some anchoring of the expectations 
of some sectors of the economy. Hence, shocks are not fully transmitted and 
monetary policy credibility seems to play a relevant role. 
ii.  The response of inflation expectations to supply shocks: To assess the 
response of inflation expectations to supply shocks, two empirical exercises were 
carried out. First, estimates of the supply shocks were computed as the difference 
between annual CPI headline inflation and several measures of core inflation.
22 The 
deviations of inflation expectations (obtained from surveys or break-even inflation) 
from headline inflation were then regressed against the estimated supply shocks in 
order to gauge the response of expectations to the shocks: 












i j i                  

   
1
 
for core inflation indicator j and inflation expectations i at horizon t+h. ij
0 measures 
the contemporaneous effect of a supply shock on the deviations of inflation 
expectations with respect to inflation. The value of this parameter can be associated 
with the credibility of the inflation regime. For instance, if ij
0  equals –1, then a 
transitory supply shock does not affect expectations, implying a perfectly credible 
monetary regime. On the contrary, if ij
0 equals 0, then a transitory supply shock 
affects inflation expectations as much as it affects inflation itself. 
Since a supply shock is likely to have persistent effects, we estimated ij
h for a set of 
regressions where the dependent variable is leading the independent variable by h 
periods. That is, Graphs 25 to 29 present the sequence of ij
h for several values of 
h. In general, one can see from the graphs that inflation expectations are partially 
anchored and that supply shocks do not affect one-to-one inflation expectations. In 
fact, for most of the cases the estimated impact was negative, though greater than –
1, ie transitory supply shocks are not entirely transmitted to inflation expectations, 
but there is no evidence of a perfectly credible regime.  
There are some drawbacks to this approach, since the estimated equation is a 
reduced form of a system that may involve both demand and supply shocks with 
                                                  
21  These shocks were constructed as the difference between actual and expected policy interest rates, where 
the latter were obtained from a Bloomberg survey. 
22   See Section 3.1 BIS Papers No 49  141
 
 
different degrees persistence, hitting the economy under varying monetary policy 
credibility. Hence, the estimates may be biased for several reasons.
23  
In a second exercise we measured the impact of inflation “surprises” on the 
dynamics of quarterly survey inflation expectations. The objective was to estimate 





















At|t+i represents the adjustment of the inflation expectations (at a fixed horizon) and 
S
t
t–1 proxies the inflation surprises. The coefficient i gauges the impact of the latter 
on the expectations adjustment. If expectations were not anchored, a transitory 
inflation surprise would be totally transmitted to the expectations (i close to one). 
The results of the estimation are presented in Graph 30. It is clear that the impact of 
inflation surprises on the expectation adjustment is significantly positive, less than 
one and decreasing with the expectation horizon. This can be interpreted as 
evidence of partial and declining transmission of inflation surprises to expectations. 
However, to obtain more robust results and reduce the probability of bias, this 
exercise could be improved to distinguish between demand and supply shocks, or 
persistent and short-lived shocks. 





t E S   1 1      
that is, as the difference between food price inflation and the past expectation of 
current inflation. To eliminate predictable, low frequency movements of the relative 
price of food, the deviations of S
t
t–1 with respect to its long-run trend (Hodrick-
Prescott) were used in the estimation. The idea was to identify the effects of short-
lived supply shocks, as approximated by short-run food price movements. Graph 31 
indicates again a positive impact of the shocks on the expectations adjustment, but 
of significantly lower magnitude. 
4. Conclusion 
The assessment of inflationary pressures in Colombia has faced two important challenges in 
the present decade. The first occurred in 2006 and consisted of detecting an overheating 
economy in the midst of fast-growing investment and increasing measured productivity. 
These phenomena suggested a large, possibly permanent supply shock that did not imply a 
risk to the achievement of the inflation target. In fact, at the time inflation reached a historical 
minimum. However, the central bank raised the policy interest rates anticipating a strong 
                                                  
23  One that is particularly important for the purpose of this paper is a situation in which monetary policy is not 
fully credible, inflation falls faster than expected inflation, following a permanent demand shock, but the 
economy is also hit by a myriad of supply shocks. In this case, a negative value of beta may emerge that does 
not imply a credible monetary policy regime. Nonetheless, an inspection of the scatter plots indicates that this 
situation has low probability, since significant portions of the data are located in an area that clearly suggests 
the presence of credibility in the sample. 142  BIS Papers No 49
 
 
demand pressure on the basis of other indicators, a decision that proved to be timely. 
Traditional indicators of productivity and unit labor costs were not sufficient to identify 
“supply” and “demand” movements, so the policymakers had to rely on a wider array of 
variables to gauge the state of the economy. 
The second challenge took place in 2007–08, when the economy was hit by a number of 
supply shocks and core inflation indicators sent diverging signals about the transmission of 
those shocks to macroeconomic inflation. An evaluation of the core inflation indicators 
according to standard criteria suggests that no particular measure seems to be clearly 
superior to the others, a result similar to that found by Rich and Steindel (2007), who explain 
this as a reflection of the varying nature of the transitory shocks hitting inflation. This implies 
that the assessment of inflationary pressures should not rely only on a single or few core 
inflation indicators, since some signals could be picked by some measures and not by 
others. More importantly, it means that the analysis of core inflation measures must be 
complemented with a careful examination of the persistence of the shocks and a close 
monitoring of their impact on inflation expectations. In fact, core inflation measures are used 
to derive estimates of the supply shocks hitting the economy to assess their impact on 
inflation expectations. It was found that the latter are formed on the basis of past inflation, but 
that the inflation target also plays a role. Moreover, inflation expectations partially move with 
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Growth of the capital stock 
 

































































































































































































































































































































































































Growth of Solow residual 
 






Real and nominal policy interest rates 
 
























































































































Total factor productivity and labor productivity 
 
Y/L = GDP/adjusted employment 
A = Solow residual 
See footnote 1 







TFP and TFP trend 
 
Source: DPI, Banco de la República 


























































































































































Labor productivity in the manufacturing industry 
Output per worker 
 
Source: DANE, calculations from DPI, Banco de la República 
 
Graph 12 
Labor productivity in the manufacturing industry 
Output per hour 
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Unit labor costs for the manufacturing industry 
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Source: DANE, calculations from DPI, Banco de la República 
 
Graph 14 
Unit labor costs for retail industry 





















































































































Capacity utilization indices for the manufacturing industry 
DANE-ANDI 
 
Source: DANE and Fedesarrollo 
Graph 16 





























































































































































































































































Source: Fedesarrollo. Calculations Banco de la República
* Average of ICC, IEC and ICE; Consumer Confidence Index, Consumption expectation 
index and Economic Conditions Index, respectively.
Consumption Confidence Indicator and Household 
Consumption 
Household Consumption
Average of Fedesarrollo's 
Index*
 







































































































































































Relative food and regulated prices* 
 

















































































































































































Impact of price shocks on real disposable income 
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Impulse response functions of a VAR for the monthly changes 
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Response of inflation expectations to supply shocks 























































































































Response of inflation expectations to supply shocks 












































































































Response of inflation expectations to supply shocks 

























































































































Response of inflation expectations to supply shocks 



















































































































Response of inflation expectations to supply shocks 






















































































































































2001  2002  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Mar-08 Jun-08  Sep-08
Final consumption  2.9 3.3  3.5 3.9 5.1 6.0 6.5 3.3  2.8 2.0
  Private consumption  2.7 3.2  3.5 3.7 4.7 6.5 6.7 3.4  3.1 2.0
  Public consumption  3.7 3.9  3.4 4.6 6.4 4.2 5.9 3.1  1.7 1.9
Gross capital formation 8.5 1.2  14.0 13.7 20.3 19.2 20.6 13.1  8.4 12.0
  Fixed gross capital formation 10.4  7.0  14.1 13.7 21.2 17.2 17.5 8.1  7.8 9.4
     Agriculture 11.0  91.2 –14.3 –9.7 –4.6 –2.3 2.6 –2.4 0.7 0.4
     Equipment and machinery  6.5 –1.9 20.8 18.0 40.7 18.8 22.5 18.9  22.0  9.9
     Transport equipment  74.1  8.4  16.0 8.7 22.6 25.5 25.4 3.0  –6.4 –22.9
     Construction 4.0 32.8 11.0 33.1 4.4 14.1 1.3 25.5  25.9  27.5
     Civil engineering 4.1 –7.3 16.0 0.8 20.7 16.7 23.3 –14.6 –13.8 10.3
     Services 25.9  5.5  8.1 7.5 6.5 17.2 9.1 1.9  4.3 2.5
  Change in private inventory  –0.8 –30.8  13.4 13.5 12.6 37.0 45.0 48.1  11.7  n.a.
Final domestic demand  3.7  3.0  5.1 5.6 7.9 8.7 9.7 5.7  4.2  4.4
Exports –0.9 –1.4 3.1 10.3 7.7 7.5 11.9 14.1  11.6  1.4
Imports 8.4 2.1  6.3 14.0 18.2 16.2 19.0 15.4  10.5  7.0
GDP  2.2  2.5  4.6 4.7 5.7 6.8 7.7 4.5  3.7  3.1
GDP annual growth by components of the demand
Dec-06 Mar-07 Jun-07 Sep-07 Dec-07 Mar-08 Jun-08 Sep-08 Dec-08
CPI inflation 4.48  5.78 6.03 5.01 5.69 5.93  7.18  7.57 7.67
Food stuffs 5.68  8.90 9.69 6.96 8.51 8.61  11.98  12.77 13.17
  Fruits, vegetables, potato and dairy  2.79 9.45 7.06 1.35 6.66 6.59  22.22  23.72 21.94
  Cereals, bakery, oils, and others  9.62  11.04 9.22 6.61 9.12 11.13  15.71  16.54 19.02
  Beef  6.27  10.55 21.70 18.09 17.27 13.66  2.84  4.24 4.27
  Poultry, fish and eggs 5.27 5.15 5.97 5.55 3.83 8.49  4.78  6.45 9.36
  Food away from home and others  5.83  7.74 8.56 8.10 7.65 6.77  7.01  7.07 7.27
Public utilities  3.51  5.80 5.71 2.30 3.77 6.83  9.19  13.89 11.64
  Gas  11.82  12.09 7.24 2.52 5.46 6.53  10.84  18.30 4.22
  Energy  3.34  4.16 3.63 –0.04 2.14 6.72  10.99  16.28 18.39
  Water, sewage and garbage collection 0.24  4.44 6.88 4.30 4.42 7.07  6.87  9.83 9.28
Gasoline 10.42  10.46 9.80 7.05 7.64 10.09  12.05  15.82 11.89
Public transportation  6.62  7.69 7.83 8.33 7.94 7.50  7.26  6.11 7.00
The remainder of the basket 
  Tradables  1.71  1.97 1.76 1.19 2.28 2.37  2.18  2.16 2.37
  Non-tradables 4.75  4.93 5.12 5.55 5.19 5.09  5.27  5.08 5.25



















































deviation T- stat P-value
Total CPI inflation 6.51 2.34
X-food 5.90 3.37 –2.672  0.009
X-food_reg 4.92 2.09 –7.853  0.000
X-"noise" 5.60 1.40 –4.874  0.000
X-food_ener 5.53 2.69 –4.537  0.000
TMV_20_9099 6.43 2.55 –0.372  0.710
Median 5.08 0.87 –8.295  0.000
Trimm_5 6.09 2.18 –2.047  0.043
Trimm_10 5.91 1.88 –3.060  0.003
Trimm_20 5.48 0.94 –5.910  0.000
TMV_opt 6.39 2.19 –0.586  0.559
TMV_5_9908 6.38 2.29 –0.619 0.537
TMV_20_9908 6.02 1.94 –2.458 0.016
Core Inflation indicators
Test for equal variances
Deviation from 
trend F-stat P-value 
Total CPI inflation 0.313
X-food 0.174 3.238 0.000 
X-food_reg 0.130 5.750 0.000 
X-"noise" 0.164 3.656 0.000 
X-food_ener 0.157 3.980 0.000 
TMV_20_9099 0.225 1.931 0.000 
Median 0.344 0.828 0.834 
Trimm_5 0.336 0.867 0.769 
Trimm_10 0.295 1.124 0.274 
Trimm_20 0.285 1.205 0.168 
TMV_opt 0.232 1.815 0.001 
TMV_5_9908 0.231 1.832 0.001 
TMV_20_9908 0.193 2.617 0.000 
























Diebold & Mariano test: 
H0: RMSE of model TMV_opt = RMSE model in row i 




Deviations of core inflation measures 























Deviation from long-run inflation
Core inflation
indicators RMSE P-value DM test
X-food  0.717 0.000
X-food_reg 2.711 0.000
TMV_20_9099  0.244 0.000
X-"noise"  1.084 0.000
X-food_ener 1.203 0.025
Median  3.283 0.000
Trimm_5  0.457 0.000
Trimm_10 0.595 0.000
Trimm_20 1.534 0.000
TMV_opt  0.181 0.000
TMV_5_9908  0.207 0.000
TMV_20_9908  0.533 0.000







X-food  1.630 0.000
X-food_reg 2.444 0.000
X-"noise"  2.270 0.000
X-food_ener 1.884 0.000
TMV_20_9099  1.873 0.002
Median 2.933 0.000
Trimm_5 1.968 0.014
Trimm_10  2.078 0.004
Trimm_20  2.506 0.000
TMV_opt  1.792 0.038
TMV_5_9908  1.845 0.011



































*: The null hypothesis of equal RMSE is not rejected at 10% significance. The reference indicator is the 
one with the smallest RMSE for each forecast horizon (shaded). 
 
Table 9 













The shaded cells are the cases in which the null hypothesis: industrial production GAP does not 
cause inflation is rejected at 10% level of significance. 




1369 1 2 1 5   18
X-food 0.34 0.51* 0.53 0.56* 0.37* 0.62* 0.78*
X-food_reg 0.35 0.51* 0.55* 0.56* 0.34* 0.61* 0.75*
X-"noise" 0.32 0.49 0.54* 0.58* 0.33 0.59* 0.74*
X-food_ener 0.34* 0.51* 0.55* 0.57* 0.35 0.62* 0.78*
TMV_20_9099 0.36 0.58* 0.62* 0.57 0.38* 0.62* 0.67*
Median 0.35* 0.68 0.82 0.66 0.38* 0.68 0.85
Trimm_5  0.38 0.66 0.78 0.59 0.38* 0.65* 0.79
Trimm_10  0.37 0.67 0.77 0.65 0.38* 0.66 0.82
Trimm_20  0.38 0.66 0.73 0.63 0.37* 0.65 0.8*
TMV_opt 0.35* 0.58 0.62* 0.59 0.37* 0.62 0.65*
TMV_5_9908 0.35* 0.58 0.62* 0.60 0.37 0.63 0.68*




1  369 12 15 18 
X-food  0.004  0.012 0.067 0.711 0.187 0.662  0.504 
X-food_reg  0.018  0.067 0.295 0.454 0.090 0.007  0.412 
X-"noise"  0.012  0.027 0.094 0.892 0.014 0.035  0.919 
X-food_ener  0.012  0.009 0.032 0.521 0.243 0.098  0.565 
TMV_20_9099  0.012  0.143 0.287 0.859 0.034 0.845  0.518 
Median  0.315  0.520 0.896 0.840 0.462 0.918  0.384 
Trimm_5  0.042  0.548 0.707 0.711 0.242 0.880  0.040 
Trimm_10  0.234  0.554 0.805 0.973 0.659 0.994  0.839 
Trimm_20  0.194  0.609 0.936 0.680 0.699 0.501  0.814 
TMV_opt  0.019  0.082 0.533 0.935 0.179 0.461  0.929 
TMV_5_9908  0.023  0.090 0.489 0.848 0.229 0.509  0.970 
TMV_20_9908  0.076  0.022 0.181 0.450 0.918 0.471  0.158 
Forecast ability of core inflation indicators
In-sample fit: Adj_R2 
Core inflation 
indicators Forecast horizon
1  369 12 15 18
X-food  0.046  0.189 0.397 0.346 0.176 0.109  0.353
X-food_reg  0.061  0.249 0.427 0.343 0.353 0.164  0.441
X-"noise"  0.137  0.303 0.417 0.237 0.215 0.216  0.393
X-food_ener  0.080  0.261 0.444 0.343 0.205 0.203  0.426
TMV_20_9099  0.013  0.171 0.426 0.271 0.096 0.121  0.345
Median  0.141  -0.028 0.020 -0.011 -0.016 -0.027  0.031
Trimm_5  0.040  0.010 0.169 0.146 0.002 -0.005  0.167
Trimm_10  0.010  -0.016 0.114 0.013 -0.027 -0.023  0.090
Trimm_20  -0.025  -0.002 0.213 0.035 -0.034 -0.005  0.194
TMV_opt  0.070  0.164 0.312 0.161 0.129 0.106  0.307
TMV_5_9908  0.058  0.140 0.301 0.132 0.116 0.082  0.292



















In yellow, adjusted R2 at least 80%. 
In bold, industrial production gap contributes significantly to explain core inflation (according to F-test 




















*: The null hypothesis of equal RMSE is not rejected at 10% significance. The reference indicator is the one 





1  369 12 15 18 
X-food  0.60  0.85  0.87 0.83 0.13 0.79 0.84 
X-food_reg  0.68  0.89  0.90 0.87 0.15 0.88 0.87 
X-"noise"  0.61  0.86  0.87 0.84 0.14 0.87 0.86 
X-food_ener  0.62  0.86  0.89 0.84 0.19 0.83 0.86 
TMV_20_9099  0.53  0.78  0.80 0.76 0.19 0.80 0.82 
Median  0.97  0.98  0.98 0.98 -0.04 0.96 0.96 
Trimm_5  0.89  0.90  0.92 0.91 -0.09 0.85 0.91 
Trimm_10  0.96  0.93  0.95 0.94 -0.06 0.92 0.93 
Trimm_20  0.97  0.95  0.96 0.96 -0.18 0.92 0.92 
TMV_opt  0.60  0.83  0.85 0.81 0.09 0.79 0.81 
TMV_5_9908  0.61  0.83  0.84 0.81 0.06 0.80 0.79 
TMV_20_9908  0.55  0.82  0.85 0.79 0.14 0.83 0.88 




13691 2 15 18
X-food 0.26* 0.30 0.30 0.21* 0.2* 0.54* 0.45*
X-food_reg 0.25* 0.23 0.22 0.18 0.18 0.33* 0.34
X-"noise" 0.26* 0.28 0.26* 0.23 0.23 0.29 0.36*
X-food_ener 0.25* 0.24* 0.24 0.19 0.19 0.3* 0.36*
TMV_20_9099 0.25* 0.36 0.37 0.33 0.29 0.42* 0.47
Median  0.33 0.33 0.33 0.30 0.27* 0.45 0.60
Trimm_5  0.62 0.56 0.48 0.46 0.45* 0.76 0.95
Trimm_10  0.47 0.34 0.36 0.33 0.31* 0.65 0.81
Trimm_20  0.45 0.38 0.34 0.29 0.29* 1.11 1.15
TMV_opt 0.29* 0.35* 0.36 0.32* 0.32 0.48* 0.47
TMV_5_9908 0.29 0.37 0.37 0.33* 0.32 0.48* 0.52





































Survey  Forecasting Horizon alpha=0 P-value Conclusion
Quarterly  4 quarters  1.013 0.319 Biased
Monthly  12 months  –1.640 0.108 Biased
Break-even inflation 1 year  12 months  –2.706 0.009 Unbiased
Expected inflation-headline inflation  = alpha + error
Survey  Forecasting horizon  alpha=0 P-value dummy=0 P-value  F-test P-value Conclusion
Quarterly  4 quarters  2.692 0.012 –4.271 0.000 18.244  0.000 Biased
Monthly  12 months  –0.069 0.945 –9.404 0.000 88.440  0.000 Unbiased
Break-even inflation 1 year  12 months  –0.103 0.918 –5.811 0.000 33.767  0.000 Unbiased
Expected inflation-headline inflation  = alpha + beta*dummy + error
dummy  = 1 for t >= Jan/2007; 0 otherwise 
Unbiasedness test 
Inflation and inflation expectations Sample Standard deviation  F-test P-value
Quarterly survey  1.642    1.062      0.303  
Headline inflation  1.546    ––
Monthly survey  0.570      0.718      0.397  
Headline inflation 0.795      ––
Break-even inflation 1 year  0.776    0.859      0.354  
Break-even inflation 5 years 0.971    1.075      0.300  
Break-even inflation 10 years 1.152    1.275      0.259  
Headline inflation  0.904    ––
2000:1 - 2008:2
2003:9 - 2008:6




Criteria for the evaluation of core inflation measures 
A.1 Bias: 
A good core inflation measure must not present a bias with respect to headline inflation over 
a long period of time. The idea is that core inflation should filter only transitory movements in 
headline inflation that are produced by short-lived supply shocks, tax adjustments or large 
relative price shocks (in the presence of nominal rigidities). Hence, on average core inflation 
must be close to headline inflation. The absence of a bias is evaluated by means of a 
standard means difference test: 
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A good core inflation measure must not be highly volatile. It should be less volatile than 
headline inflation, since it is supposed to filter transitory shocks. Volatility in this context is 
understood as the variance of inflation around its long-term trend. To evaluate volatility, a 
hypothesis test for equal variances of core and total inflation is performed. The variance 
measure is the root mean square deviation of each core inflation indicator with respect to its 
trend. The trend is obtained using the Hodrick-Prescott filter of the corresponding core 





A.3  Ability to forecast future inflation: 
Assuming that core inflation is stable, its current level must help forecast future headline 
inflation, since transitory shocks are filtered.
24 The following model was estimated and 
recursive forecasts were obtained to check in-sample and out-of-sample fit. Recursive 
forecasts for the period January 2005–November 2008 were obtained. The in-sample fit 
measure is the Adjusted – R2. The out of sample fit measure is the RMSE of the recursive 
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A.4  Ability to track the long-run component of CPI inflation: 
One of the most desirable features of a core inflation indicator is its ability to detect turning 
points of macroeconomic inflation. To check for this characteristic, the deviation of each core 
inflation indicator with respect to an estimate of long-run inflation was obtained. The indicator 
with the smallest RMSE is said to be the one that best tracks macroeconomic inflation. The 
































Alternatively, the deviations of core inflation measures from the inflation target were 
compared with a diffusion index that captures the percentage of the CPI basket whose price 
changes are above the inflation target. The higher the value of the diffusion index, the more 
widespread inflationary pressures are. In this sense, the deviation of a good core inflation 
indicator from the target should closely correlate with the diffusion index. This is measured 
using the corresponding RMSE.  
A.5  Relationship with macroeconomic determinants of inflation (output gap): 
Since core inflation measures supposedly track macroeconomic inflation, they must display a 
close relationship with the macroeconomic determinants of inflation. In particular, they should 
be related to lagged values of the output gap and the change in the price of imports. To 
check for this property, causality tests between output gap and core inflation are performed. 
To do this, open economy Phillips curves were estimated. The equation includes the 
industrial production gap, relative prices of imports and lagged information of core inflation. 
The number of lags to be included in the equation was determined by BIC criteria (12 lags of 
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Adjusted – R2 and the RMSE of recursive out-of-sample forecasts for the period January 
2006–November 2007. Additionally, we test the hypothesis of all the parameters associated 
to the IP-GAP be equal to zero: 
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